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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Ginger Key pled guilty to possession of marijuana in a quantity greater 
than three ounces. She appeals from the district court's order forfeiting her 
vehicle after her conviction, pursuant to I.C. § 37-2801. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedinqs 
A drug dog alerted on the vehicle Ginger Key was driving after an Idaho 
County Sheriff's deputy initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle. (PSI, p.2) A large 
plastic bag with smaller plastic bags containing a total of approximately 5.23 
ounces of marijuana was found in a backpack inside the vehicle. (Id.) Inside 
Key's purse was $2100 in cash. (Id.) 
The state charged Key with possession of marijuana with the intent to 
deliver, possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver where a child is 
present, and possession of marijuana in an amount greater than three ounces. 
(R., pp.24-25.) The state also requested criminal forfeiture of Key's 1992 Toyota 
Celica and $2100 in cash. (R., pp.26-29.) The state later withdrew its request to 
forfeit the $2100. (Tr., VoI. 1, p. 96, Ls. 4-13.) 
The parties reached a plea agreement whereby Key agreed to plead guilty 
to possession of marijuana in an amount greater than three ounces and the state 
agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. (R., pp.78-84.) The state agreed to 
recommend that the court retain jurisdiction, with no agreement as to a 
recommended prison term, fine, restitution, or the forfeiture of the car. (R., pp. 
78-84.) Counts I and II were dismissed, Key pled guilty to count Ill pursuant to 
the agreement, and was sentenced to five years in prison with two fixed and the 
court retained jurisdiction. (R. pp.96-98.) The district court imposed no fine (Id), 
ordered restitution in the amount of $800 (R., p. 119), and ordered Key's vehicle 
forfeited. (R., pp.125-128). Key was placed on probation for five years following 
the period of retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.116-120.) Key filed a timely notice of 
appeal. (R., pp.131-I 32.) 
ISSUES 
Key states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Was Ms. Key's constitutional right to a jury trial, pursuant to 
Article 1, 3 7 of the Idaho State Constitution violated when 
the issue of whether the State was entitled to forfeiture of 
Ms. Key's vehicle was tried before the district court judge, 
despite the fact that Ms. Key never waived her right to a jury 
determination of this issue? 
2. Was Ms. Key's constitutional right to a jury trial, pursuant to 
the Sixth Amendment of the United States constitution, 
violated when the issue of whether the State was entitled to 
forfeiture of Ms. Key's vehicle was tried before the district 
court judge, despite the fact that Ms. Key never waived her 
right to a jury determination of this issue? 
3. Did the district court err when it failed to make a 
determination, pursuant to I.C. § 37-2809, whether the size 
of the property forfeited was unfairly disproportionate to the 
size of the property actually used in the commission of Ms. 
Key's underlying offense? 
4. Did the district court's order forfeiting Ms. Key's vehicle 
violate the Eight Amendment prohibition against excessive 
fines? 
5. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it determined 
that Ms. Key's vehicle was used to commit or facilitate her 
offense of possession of marijuana? 
(Appellant's brief, p.8.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did Key fail to preserve the issue of the constitutionality of I.C. § 37-2801 
for appeal? If the issue can be raised for the first time on appeal, is there 
a constitutional right to a jury trial under either the U.S. Constitution or the 
ldaho State Constitution for criminal drug asset forfeiture proceedings? 
2. Has Key failed to demonstrate that the proportionality test set forth in I.C. 
§ 37-2809, applies to personal property such as her vehicle? Even if the 
proportionality test does apply, has Key failed to demonstrate that the size 
of the property forfeited was unfairly disproportionate to the size of the 
property actually used in the commission of Key's underlying offense? 
3. Has Key failed to demonstrate that the forfeiture of her vehicle was an 
excessive fine in violation of the Eighth Amendment? 
4. Has Key failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion 
when it determined that Key's vehicle was subject to forfeiture pursuant to 
I.C. § 37-2801? 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Kev Has Failed To Demonstrate That I.C. 5 37-2801 Is Unconstitutional 
A. Introduction 
The district court forfeited Key's vehicle pursuant to I.C. § 37-2801, which 
states that "the issue of criminal forfeiture shall be for the court alone, without 
submission to a jury, as a part of the sentencing procedure within the criminal 
action." I.C. § 37-2801. Key asserts that the district court erred in not apprising 
her "of her right to a jury determination on the issue of forfeiture of her vehicle." 
(Appellant's brief, p.1 I .) Key argues that she had a right to a jury trial in criminal 
forfeiture proceedings pursuant to both the U.S. Constitution and the ldaho 
Constitution. (Appellant's brief, pp. 9-13.) Her argument fails for two reasons: 
first, because the constitutionality of a statute is an issue that must be raised 
below and she failed to do so; and second, because the portion of the statute 
dealing with juries does not violate the U.S. Constitution or the ldaho 
Constitution. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one 
of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free 
review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the 
facts found. State v. Cantrell, 139 ldaho 409, 411, 80 P.3d 345, 347 (Ct. App. 
2003). A claim that a defendant's due process rights were violated is a question 
of law, subject to free review. State v. Gilpin, 132 ldaho 643, 649, 977 P.2d 905, 
I 91 1 (Ct. App. 1999). 
I C. Because Key Failed To Raise The Issue Of The Constitutionalitv Of I.C. 3 
37-2801 Below, It Cannot Be Heard For The First Time On Appeal 
I 
I 
I The Idaho legislature declared that the "issue of criminal forfeiture shall be 
I 
for the court alone, without submission to a jury, as a part of the sentencing 
procedure within the criminal action." I.C. § 37-2801. "It is generally presumed 
I 
that legislative acts are constitutional, that the state legislature has acted within 
I 
1 its constitutional powers, and any doubt concerning interpretation of a statute is 
1 
to be resolved in favor of that which will render the statute constitutional." 
I 
McLean v. Maverik Countrv Stores, Inc., 142 ldaho 810, 814, 135 P.3d 756, 
760 (ldaho 2006) (citing Olsen v. J.A. Freeman Co., 117 ldaho 706, 709, 791 
P.2d 1285, 1288 (1990).) 
I 
"Constitutional issues generally will not be considered by an appellate 
~ court if raised for the first time on appeal. Failure to raise such an issue below is 
a waiver of the right to raise the issue on appeal." State v. Fox, 130 ldaho 385, 
387, 941 P.2d 357, 359 (Ct. App. 1997). When the trial court was not given the 
opportunity to rule upon the constitutionality of the statute, the appellate court will 
not consider the issue on appeal. a. See also State v. Wiedmeier, 121 ldaho 
189, 192, 824 P.2d 120, 123 (1992) (court refused to consider appellant's claim 
that statute was unconstitutional); Sanchez v. Arave, 120 ldaho 321, 322, 815 
P.2d 1061, 1062 (1991) (same); Oreaon Shortline Railroad Companv v. Citv of 
Chubbock, 93 ldaho 815, 817, 474 P.2d 244, 246 (1970) (court refused to 
consider respondent's claim that statute was unconstitutional); State v. Hollon, 
136 ldaho 499, 503, 36 P.3d 1287, 1291 (Ct. App. 2001) (challenge to 
constitutionality of statute will not be considered for the first time on appeal). 
issues not raised to or decided by the trial court are generally not preserved for 
appellate review. State v. Green, 130 ldaho 503, 506, 943 P.2d 929, 932 (1997) 
("We will not review a trial court's alleged error on appeal unless the record 
discloses an adverse ruling which forms the basis for the assignment of error."); 
see also State v. DuValt, 131 ldaho 550, 553, 961 P.2d 641, 644 (1998); State v. 
&, 121 ldaho 842, 844, 828 P.2d 871, 873 (1992); State v. Mauro, 121 ldaho 
178, 180, 824 P.2d 109, 11 1 (1991). Because Key failed to raise the issue of 
the constitutionality of the statute to the district court, it cannot be heard for the 
first time on appeal.' 
D. I.C. 6 37-2801 Does Not Violate The U.S. Constitution Because There Is 
No Right To A Jurv Determination Of A Criminal Drug Asset Forfeiture 
Under The U.S. Constitution 
The provision of I.C. § 37-2801 placing the issue of criminal forfeiture 
before a judge rather than a jury does not violate the U.S. Constitution. The U.S. 
Supreme Court has flatly held that there is no Sixth Amendment right to a jury 
trial in a criminal forfeiture. Libretti v. US, 516 U.S. 29 (1995). Key 
acknowledges that the "U.S. Supreme Court has addressed, and rejected, the 
assertion that there is a Sixth Amendment right to a jury determination in criminal 
1 The state further notes that Key's claim that she never waived her right to a jury 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 9, 13) is without merit because a guilty plea waives that 
right. See Workman v. State, 144 ldaho 518, 527, 1654 P.3d 798, 807 (2007) 
(valid guilty plea requires waiver of right to trial by jury). 
forfeiture actions." (Appellant's brief, p. 16.) However, Key claims that the 
Court's "basis for doing so has since been disavowed by the Supreme Court." 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 16-17) (citing Blakelv v. Washinaton, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) 
and Apprendi v, New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)). This argument has been 
made and repeatedly rejected by U.S. Circuit Courts throughout the nation. 
Apprendi involved a state hate crime statute that allowed for an increase 
in the maximum prison sentence based on a judge's finding by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the defendant acted with the purpose to intimidate the victim 
based on particular characteristics of the victim. Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466. The 
court found that because the finding increased the statutory maximum 
punishment, the question must be put to a jury, not a judge. jcj. Blakelv held 
that any fact, other than the fact of a prior conviction, which increases the 
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted 
to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Blakeiy, 542 U.S. 296. 
Criminal drug forfeiture statutes do not increase the statutory maximum 
punishment, but are part of the available punishment upon conviction of a drug 
crime. Therefore, and Apprendi are not applicable. 
Numerous courts have addressed and rejected arguments similar to the 
one Key makes. As the Sixth Circuit stated: 
[Blakeiy] redefined what constitutes a statutory maximum for Sixth 
Amendment purposes, the forfeiture statute at issue in this case 
(and, we suspect, most forfeiture statues) does not contain a 
statutory maximum. ... Determining the forfeitable proceeds of an 
offense does not come within Apprendi's rule, because there is no 
'prescribed statutory maximum' and no risk that the defendant has 
been convicted de facto of a more serious offense. The absence 
of a statutory maximum or any sort of guidelines system indicates 
that the forfeiture amounts to a form of indeterminate sentencing, 
which has never presented a Sixth Amendment problem. 
US. v. H a  411 F.3d 651, 654-655 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). 
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit stated: "Libretti has not been overruled by Blakely ... 
Libretti therefore controls the constitutional issue 'unless and until the Supreme 
Court itself determines to overrule it.'" U.S. v. Washinaton, 131 Fed.Appx. 976 
(5th Cir. 2005). The Third Circuit stated that Libretti "flatly holds that the Sixth 
Amendment is not implicated in the forfeiture context. ... We are not free to 
ignore the Supreme Court's holding in Libretti, nor do we possess the authority to 
declare that the Supreme Court has implicitly overruled one of its own decisions." 
U.S. v. Leahy, 438 F.3d 328, 355-356 (3(* Cir. 2006). The Seventh Circuit also 
rejected the argument, stating: 
We have previously held that Apprendi has no effect on criminal 
forfeiture proceedings because forfeiture provisions have no 
statutory maximum. United States v. Vera, 278 F.3d 672, 673 (7th 
Cir. 2002). Apprendi's statutory maximum was supplied by the 
statute of conviction; Blakely 's is external-- the statutory maximum 
is found not in the criminal code, but instead, the sentencing 
guidelines. See Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 509. The criminal forfeiture 
provisions do not include a statutory maximum; they are open- 
ended in that a// property representing proceeds of illegal activity is 
subject to forfeiture. Vera, 278 F.3d at 673; U.S.S.G. § 5E1.4; 21 
U.S.C. § 853. Therefore, we conclude that Blakely, like Apprendi, 
does not apply to forfeiture proceedings. 
th . U.S. V. Messino, 382 F.3d 704, 713 (7 Clr. 2004). See also U.S. v. Keene, 341 
F.3d 78, 86 (1'' Cir. 2003); U.S. v. Fruchter, 41 1 F.3d 377 (znd Cir. 2005); 
NaJ&r, 300 F.3d 466, 485-486 (4th Cir. 2002); U.S. v. Shrvock, 342 F.3d 948, 991 
th . 
(9 Clr. 2003); U.S. v. Cabeza, 258 F.3d 1256, 1257 ( I  lth Cir. 2001). 
This court should reject Key's argument that the Supreme Court has 
implicitly overruled its own decision in Libretti. Libretti controls the constitutional 
issue of the right to a jury trial in criminal forfeitures unless and until the Supreme 
Court itself determines to overrule it. Because Libretti held there is no right to a 
jury trial in criminal forfeiture, Key has failed to establish that there is any Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial before criminal forfeiture can be imposed at 
sentencing. 
E. I.C. 6 37-2801 Does Not Violate The ldaho Constitution Because There Is 
No Riaht To A Jury Determination Of A Criminal Drug Asset Forfeiture 
Under The ldaho State Constitution 
The provision of I.C. § 37-2801 placing the issue of criminal forfeiture 
before a judge rather than a jury, does not violate the ldaho Constitution. In 
Idaho, the scope of the right to trial by jury is defined by reference to the 
common law right to trial by jury, as it existed at the time the ldaho Constitution 
was adopted. Christensen v. Hollingsworth, 6 ldaho 87, 53 P. 211 (1898); 
Shields v. Johnson, 10 ldaho 476, 79 P. 391 (1904). The constitutional right is 
not to be extended beyond the common law view of the right, and it is clear that 
the common law did not extend to all fact-finding. Christensen, 6 ldaho 87, 53 P. 
211; People v. Burnham, 35 ldaho 522, 207 P. 589 (1922). For example, there 
was no common law right to a jury trial in equitable cases or to test the legal right 
of one to hold a public office, and therefore such cases were not among those 
constitutionally required to  be resolved by a jury. Christensen, 6 ldaho 87, 53 P. 
211; Burnham, 35 ldaho 522, 207 P. 589. See also, State v. Jutila, 34 ldaho 
An early ldaho Supreme Court case, In Re Dawson, 20 ldaho 178, 117 P. 
696 (191 I), clearly reflects the understanding of the courts of ldaho that the right 
to trial by jury was unrelated to sentencing proceedings. Dawson entered a plea 
of guilty to a felony offense and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment. On 
appeal he contended that the court was without "jurisdiction to commit petitioner 
to the penitentiary upon his plea of guilty without a trial by jury." Dawson, 20 
ldaho at 181, 117 P, at 699. Rejecting this contention, the court held that the 
issue to be tried by a jury was the guilt or innocence in a criminal case: 
If, then, the right of trial by jury is reserved to the citizens of the 
state under this provision of the constitution, it is such right of trial 
as was provided for and permitted under the common law, and 
under the common Jaw the right of trial by jury existed in cases 
where the plea of the accused presented an issue triable before a 
jury. 
Dawson, 20 ldaho at 184, 117 P. at 702. The court held that a plea of guilty 
exhausted all of the issues triable by a jury, that is, those relating to guilt or 
innocence: 
under the constitution and laws of this state, a person charged with 
a crime is given time and opportunity to deliberate, and consult and 
advise with counsel before he is required to plead to an indictment 
or information charging him with a crime, and these various 
provisions have no doubt been made in view of the fact that a 
defendant charged with a felony may be convicted upon a plea of 
guilty, in which case there is no issue fo try and the provisions of 
$7, art. I ,  of the constifufion do nof apply. " 
Dawson, 20 ldaho at 181, 177 P. at 699 (emphasis added.) The issue presented 
in Dawson was one of jurisdiction, and it would not have been possible for the 
court to say that no issue remained for trial by jury after a guilty plea had been 
made if the law were that it was mandatory that sentencing issues also be tried 
before a jury. 
Because criminal forfeiture under I.C. § 37-2801 is a discretionary 
sentencing function of the court, there would have been no right to a jury 
determination of the sentence under the common law of the state of ldaho. Key 
has failed to demonstrate that there is a right to a jury trial in a determination of 
criminal forfeiture. 
Nevertheless, Key asserts that because the ldaho Supreme Court has 
recognized a constitutional right to a jury trial in civil forfeiture actions, therefore 
she had a right to a jury determination of the criminal forfeiture of her vehicle 
based upon her conviction of a drug offense. (Appellant's brief, pp. 11 -1 3.) This 
argument is without merit. As noted by Key, "the criminal forfeiture statute is 
significantly more limited in scope than the civil forfeiture statute." (Appellant's 
brief, p.25.) Civil forfeiture actions brought under I.C. 3 37-2477A are in rem 
proceedings "brought in the name of the state against the property sought to be 
forfeited." ldaho Department of Law Enforcement v. Kluss, 125 ldaho 682, 873 
P.2d 1336 (1994), overruled on other grounds by Rincover v. State, Dep't of 
Finance. Sec. Bureau, 132 ldaho 547, 976 P.2d 473 (1999). Unlike a criminal 
forfeiture, a criminal conviction of the real property owner is not required to 
proceed with a civil forfeiture. Department of Law Enforcement v. $34,000, 121 
ldaho 219,824 P.2d 150 (1991). 
The right to a jury trial in a wholly separate civil action is not comparable 
to a court's sentencing function in a criminal case, which is exercised only after a 
guilty plea or jury determination of guilt. As stated by the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, a criminal forfeiture "involves the implementation of the sentence of 
forfeiture. Because sentencing is distinct from the criminal liability phase of trial, 
any factfinding at sentencing, as well as in proceedings ancillary to sentencing, is 
conducted by the court, not a jury." U.S. v. McHan, 345 F.3d 262, 274 
(4th Cir. 2003) (citing Libretti, 516 U.S. at 49.) Key has failed to demonstrate that 
there is a right to a jury trial in criminal forfeitures under the ldaho Constitution. 
Key Has Failed To Demonstrate That The Proportionality Test Set Forth In I.C. § 
37-2809 Applies To Personal Property Such As Her Vehicle. Furthermore, Even 
If The Proportionality Test Does Apply, Key Has Failed To Demonstrate That 
The Size Of The Property Forfeited Was Unfairly Disproportionate To The Size 
Of The Property Actually Used In The Commission Of The Underlyinq Offense 
A. Introduction 
Key asserts that forfeiture is only allowed when the size of the property 
forfeited is not unfairly disproportionate to the size of the property actually used 
in violation of the uniform controlled substances act. (Appellant's brief, p. 18). 
This argument fails as a plain reading of I.C. 37-2809 shows that 
proportionality is a concept only applicable to real property, not personal property 
like Key's vehicle. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Questions of statutory interpretation are given free review. State v. 
Maidwell, 137 ldaho 424,426, 50 P.3d 439,441 (2002). 
C. The Proportionality Test Set Forth In I.C. 6 37-2809 Applies Only To Real 
Property, Not Personal Property Such As Kev's Vehicle 
The interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of a 
statute. State v. Schwartz, 139 ldaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003). Those 
words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning and the statute 
must be construed as a whole. jcj. Where the language of a statute is plain and 
unambiguous, the court must give effect to the statute as written, without 
engaging in statutory construction. State v. Rhode, 133 ldaho 459, 462, 988 
P.2d 685, 688 (1999); State v. McCoy, 128 ldaho 362, 365, 913 P.2d 578, 581 
(1996). The court assumes that the legislature meant what is clearly stated in 
the statute, unless the result is "palpably absurd." Schwartz, 139 ldaho at 362, 
79 P.3d at 721; &Q&, 133 ldaho at 462, 988 P.2d at 688. 
Thus, this Court must first determine if the statute is plain and unambiguous. If 
not, the Court must then resort to legislative history and rules of statutory 
interpretation to determine legislative intent. 
1.C. Ij 37-2809 reads in its entirety: 
5 37-2809. Proportionality 
In issuing any order under the provisions of this chapter, the court 
shall make a determination that the property, or a portion thereof in 
the case of real property, was actually used in violation of the 
provisions of this chapter. The size of the property forfeited shall 
not be unfairly disproportionate to the size of the property actually 
used in violation of the provisions of this chapter. 
I.C. § 37-2809. A plain reading of the language of this statute demonstrates that, 
although personal property is not subject to forfeiture unless "actually used" in 
the crime, the proportionality test does not apply to personal property. 
Under a plain reading of the statute, the proportionality test was only 
intended to be used for real property. The legislature distinguished real property 
from personal property by saying that the court could make a determination that 
"a portion" of the real property was used in violation of the uniform controlled 
substances act. This comports with common sense. A tract of real property may 
involve acres of land and multiple buildings; thus, it makes sense to consider 
whether only a portion of the property was used in violation of the controlled 
substances act. For example, if one drug transaction is conducted out of a small 
shed on a 100 acre tract, and no other portion of the property is used in violation 
of the act, it would likely be unfairly disproportionate to forfeit all 100 acres. Land 
can be divided by lots or acres and buildings can be divided by rooms. 
While real property is generally divisible, personal property is not. Cell 
phones, guns, containers and cars are commonly used in violation of the 
uniformed controlled substance act, but no realistic argument can be made that 
"a portion" of a cell phone was made to place a call, that "a portion" of a gun was 
used for protection, that "a portion" of a container held drugs, or "a portion" of a 
car was used to transport drugs. Therefore, when a forfeiture involves personal 
property the issue is all or nothing: either the property was used in violation of 
the act or it was not. Because there is no portioning, it makes no sense to 
consider whether the size of the property forfeited is unfairly disproportionate to 
the size of the property actually used in violation of the provisions of this chapter. 
If all of the property was used in violation of the act, forfeiting all of the property 
cannot be unfairly disproportionate to the size of the property actually used, 
because the size used is always equal to the size that is being forfeited. Under a 
plain reading of the statute, Key has failed to demonstrate that the proportionality 
test applies to personal property. 
D. Even If The Proportionalitv Test Were Applied To Her Case, Kev Has 
Failed To Demonstrate That The Size Of The Propertv Forfeited Was 
Unfairly Disproportionate To The Size Of The Propertv Actually Used In 
The Commission Of The Underlvinq Offense 
The proportionality test states that "the size of the property forfeited shall 
not be unfairly disproportionate to the size of the property actually used in 
violation of the provisions of this chapter." I.C. § 37-2809. As mentioned above, 
it is difficult to imagine how a person can only use part of a car to possess or 
transport drugs. In this case, the drugs were found in the main passenger 
compartment of the vehicle. So, in essence the whole vehicle was used to 
possess and transport the drugs. Although the wheels were apparently not in 
direct contact with the drugs, they were supporting the rest of the car. Likewise, 
the engine was used to get the car and its contents, including the drugs, to the 
location where the police encountered it. Because all of the car was used in 
violation of the uniformed controlled substance acts, the "size" of the forfeited 
property is not unfairly disproportionate to the "size" of the property used in the 
crime. Key has failed to demonstrate that the district court erred. 
Key Has Failed To Demonstrate That The Forfeiture Of Her Vehicle Was An 
Excessive Fine In Violation Of The Eiqhth Amendment 
A. Introduction 
Key alleges that the forfeiture of her vehicle, which she stipulated was 
worth only $1500 ( Tr., Voi. I, p. 85, L. 22 - p.86,L. 6), was an excessive fine in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment. She has failed to demonstrate that the 
forfeiture was grossly disproportionate to the gravity of her offense. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a forfeiture constitutes a fine in violation of the excessive fines 
clause of the United States Constitution is reviewed de novo. United States v. 
Baiakaiian, 524 U.S. 321, 336-37, 118 S.Ct. 2028 (1998). 
C. The Record Shows That The Forfeiture Of The Car Was Not "Grossly 
Disproportionate" To The Offense 
The burden of demonstrating a violation of the Eighth Amendment is on 
the person asserting the constitutional violation. Nez Perce Countv Prosecuting 
Attorney v. Reese,142 Idaho 893, 136 P.3d 364 (Ct. App. 2006). Key has failed 
to demonstrate a violation of the Eighth Amendment in the forfeiture of her car. 
The first consideration in determining the constitutionality of a forfeiture "is 
that judgments about the appropriate punishment for an offense belong in the 
first instance to the legislature." Baiakaiian, 524 U.S. at 336. It is thus not 
enough for a court to conclude that it would not impose a fine as large as the 
legislatively authorized forfeiture. in this case the legislature has specifically 
provided that any person convicted of a drug offense punishable by more than 
one year in prison "shall forfeit to the state of Idaho: . . . Any of the person's 
property used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to 
facilitate the commission of such violation." I.C. 3 37-2801. A fine or forfeiture is 
unconstitutional if it is grossly disproportional to the gravity of the offense. 
Baiakaiian, 524 U.S. at 344. Key failed to demonstrate that the forfeiture of her 
car, as authorized by the Idaho Legislature, is "grossly disproportional to the 
gravity of [her] offense." Baiakaiian, 524 U.S. at 334. She has therefore failed to 
demonstrate that the district court erred in forfeiting her vehicle. 
In Baiakaiain the United States Supreme Court addressed the forfeiture of 
over $350,000 for failing to report that money was being taken out of the country. 
The court noted that the maximum sentence Bajakajian would have faced was 
six months in jail and a $5000 fine; that the lack of reporting was unrelated to 
other illegal activities (such as drug trafficking or money laundering) but instead 
the money had been lawfully earned and was to be lawfully employed; and that 
the harm Bajakajian caused was "minimal." Baiakaiian, 524 U.S. at 337-40. The 
Supreme Court found that in that specific case, the forfeiture was grossly 
disproportionate to the gravity of the offense. 
By way of contrast, in a Minnesota case, the forfeiture of a $16,000 
vehicle for a repeat offense of driving while impaired did not constitute excessive 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Miller v. One 2001 Pontiac Aztek, 
669 N.W.2d 893 (Minn. 2003). The court reasoned that "the value of appellant's 
vehicle was not much different than other vehicles, nor is it grossly different than 
other fines for crimes of a similar serious nature. Id. at 898'." 
In this case, the parties stipulated that the value of the Toyota Celica was 
$1500. (Tr., vol. I ,  p. 85, L.22 - p.86,L.6.) The court did not impose a separate 
fine as part of her sentence. (R., pp. 96-98.) The quantity of the marijuana she 
possessed (5.23 ounces) was well over the three ounce threshold for a felony. 
The penalty faced by Key was up to five years in prison and a fine of $10,000. 
I.C. § 37-2732(e). Clearly, the Idaho Legislature considers possession of 
marijuana in an amount over three ounces to be a serious offense by the nature 
and amount of punishment it prescribed. Punishment for possession of 
marijuana in excess of three ounces is comparable to that for aggravated assault 
(five years and $5000, I.C. § 18-906), involuntary manslaughter (10 years and 
$10,000, I.C. § 18-4007), burglary (one to ten years, no fine, I.C. § 18-1403), 
felony injury to a child (one to ten years, no fine, I.C. fj 18-1501(1)), possession 
of sexually exploitative materials (five years and $5000, I.C. 3 18-1507A), and 
felony malicious injury to property (five years and $1000, I.C. 3 18-7001). Even 
more telling, however, is that the legislature specifically provided for broad 
forfeiture for drug offenses that it did not provide for in relation to these other 
offenses. 
Key has failed to demonstrate that the forfeiture of her $1500 car was an 
excessive fine in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 
2 The court noted that the maximum penalty for the crime in that case was 7 
years in prison and a $14,000 fine. Id. 
Kev Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
When It Determined That Kev's Vehicle Was Used To Commit Or Facilitate Her 
Offense 
A. Introduction 
Key asserts that there was insufficient evidence to support the forfeiture of 
her vehicle. Key has failed to establish that the district court erred, as there was 
substantial and competent evidence to support forfeiture. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Factual findings will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Pointer v. 
Johnson, 107 ldaho 1014, 1018,695 P.2d 399,403 (1985). It is well-established 
that an appellate court will presume factual findings supported by the record that 
are consistent with the district court's action. See State v. Kirkwood, 11 1 ldaho 
623, 625, 726 P.2d 735, 737 (1 986) ("The implicit findings of the trial court, (i.e., 
that statements of the defendant made to the police were voluntary and should 
not be suppressed) should be overturned only if not supported by substantial 
evidence."); State v. DuValt, 131 ldaho 550, 553, 961 P.2d 641, 644 (1998) 
("[Alny implicit findings of the trial court supported by substantial evidence should 
be given due deference."). In determining if the evidence is substantial and 
competent, it will be considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution. 
State v. Miller, 131 ldaho 288, 292, 955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997). An 
appellate court will not substitute its views as to the weight of the evidence or the 
credibility of the witnesses. State v. Allen, 129 ldaho 556, 558, 929 P.2d 118, 
120 (1996). Conclusions of law are subject to free review. Riley v. Rowan, 131 
Idaho 831, 833,965 P.3d 191, 193 (1 998). 
C. Key Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Abused Its 
Discretion When It Determined That Kev's Vehicle Was Used To Commit 
Or Facilitate Her Offense 
The court in this case found that Key's vehicle was used to facilitate the 
possession of the drugs found in her car. (R., pp.125-128.) The court noted that 
the drugs were found in a backpack in the passenger compartment of her car. 
(R., p.128.) For the forfeiture portion of the sentencing hearing, the state 
primarily relied upon the evidence that was submitted to the court at the pretrial 
motion to suppress and the acts regarding the offense which were recounted in 
the presentence investigation. (Tr., Vol I, p. 86, Ls. 7-14.) Key did not object to 
the court considering that evidence. The state argued that the vehicle was used 
to facilitate the possession and transportation of the marijuana. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 91, 
Ls. 8-21.) Key has failed to demonstrate that there was insufficient evidence to 
support the court's finding that the vehicle facilitated a violation of the uniform 
controlled substances act. 
When the officer first observed Key's vehicle it was parked, but Key was 
driving the vehicle on Highway 14 when the officer initiated a traffic stop. (Tr., 
Vol. 1, p. 12, L. 10 - p. 17, L. 3.) Prior to finding drugs in the backpack, the 
officer observed Key "in the car leaning behind the seats sticking towels down in 
a black leather backpack that was roughly in the middle of the car but behind the 
front seats. She was shoving towels in it ...." (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 32, Ls. 1-4.) When 
the officer "opened up the back pack, [the officer] pulled out the two towels that 
[he] saw Ms. Key stuffing into the backpack. Underneath the two towels [he] saw 
a large bag, plastic bag with a green leafy substance in it." (Tr., Vol. 1, p.33, L. 
25 - p. 34, L. 3.) It "looked like about a gallon bag, gallon size zip lock baggie of 
- it was a clear plastic bag with smaller clear plastic bags of a green leafy 
substance" which "looked and smelled exactly like ... marijuana." (Tr., Vol. I, 
p.34, L. 24 - p. 35, L. 3.) Ultimately, two backpacks were found in the vehicle, 
the black leather back pack and a brown knit backpack. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.46, L. 8- 
12.) When talking with a detective, Key admitted ownership of both backpacks, 
she also admitted ownership of the contents of the brown knit backpack which 
included suspected marijuana and drug paraphernalia, but denied knowledge of 
the large quantity of marijuana in the black backpack. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.47, L. 14 - 
p. 48, L. 3.) The detective found a drug ledger in the black leather backpack 
containing entries consistent with the weights of marijuana found in the 
backpack. (Tr., Vol. I, p.51, L. 17 - p. 52, L. 5.; p. 54, Ls. 10-18.) The detective 
also noted that there was a separate note "basically of a recorded or prepared 
response to an officer - or appear [sic] to be for an officer that had made a traffic 
stop with somebody. So, I pulled this particular item out because it showed that 
there was possible preparation for being stopped by an officer and refusing a 
search." (Tr., Vol. 1, p.53, Ls. 12-17.) Key told the detective that she was "on 
her way to Elk City to meet with a subject that she called Buford" which matched 
a name on a drug ledger found in the car. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.55, Ls. 4-16.) Also 
located in her car was "a small tin container with small - unsmoked ends of 
rolled cigarettes that smelled like marijuana. Located inside Ms. Key's purse 
was $2100 in cash." (PSI, p. 2.) After testing, the substance found in the car 
was confirmed as marijuana with an approximate weight of 5.23 ounces. (Id.) 
During her presentence investigation, Key denied that she had been selling 
marijuana and stated that the marijuana was all hers for personal use. (PSI, p. 
3.) Based on the totality of the circumstances in this case, Key has failed to 
show that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the vehicle 
facilitated a violation of the uniform controlled substances act. 
Key argues that the vehicle "must be somehow used in order to purchase 
or otherwise acquire, and therefore come into possession of, the drugs that are 
the subject of the defendant's crime." (Appellant's brief, p. 26) (citing State v. 
Stevens, 139 Idaho 670, 84 P.3d 1038 (Ct. App. 2004).) While this was par! of 
the holding in Stevens, it is an incomplete statement of the holding of the court. 
The Stevens court made that holding when faced with the fact that no drugs 
were found in Stevens's vehicle. This fact alone distinguishes Stevens from 
Key's case. As the court noted in Stevens: 
Stevens was convicted of possessing with intent to deliver the 
particular methamphetamine found in his clothing and at his home. 
It was therefore, the State's burden to prove that the motorcycle 
was used to facilitate the possession of those drugs. The requisite 
relationship between the motorcycle and the offense would have 
been established if the State had proven that at least part of the 
drugs he was carrying were acquired during his visit to the 
residence after having driven there on his motorcycle. 
No drugs were found in the motorcycle itself, and there was no 
evidence that Stevens had previously used the motorcycle to obtain 
the drugs he possessed when arrested or that he was using his 
motorcycle to deliver the drugs in his possession to another. 
Stevens, 139 Idaho at 675-676, 84 P.3d 1043-1044. The forfeiture of Stevens's 
motorcycle was overturned because there was no evidence that he used his 
motorcycle to acquire the drugs found in his clothing or in his home, no drugs 
were found in the motorcycle itself, and no evidence existed that he had 
previously used his motorcycle to obtain the specific drugs he possessed when 
arrested, or that he was using the motorcycle to deliver the drugs in his 
possession to another. Unlike Stevens, the drugs Key was convicted of 
possessing were actually found in her vehicle, and there was some evidence that 
she was using the vehicle to deliver drugs to "Buford" as his name was on a drug 
ledger found in the car with quantity and dollar amounts beside it and she told 
the detective she was on her way to see "Buford." (Tr., Vol. 1, p.55, L. 4 - p. 56, 
L. 9.) 
Key has failed to demonstrate that the court's finding that Key's vehicle 
was used to facilitate her possession of the drugs found in her car was not 
supported by the record. 
CONCLUSION 
Key has failed to demonstrate that the district court erred in forfeiting her 
vehicle. Therefore, the state requests that this court affirm the district court's 
decision. 
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